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VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
APRIL 1972

VOLUME 58

NUMBER 4

A COMMENT ON TRIAL-TYPE HEARINGS
IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SITING
Roger C. Cramton*
One of the curious aspects of the contemporary scene is that the use
of formal evidentiary hearings in administrative decision-making is expanding rapidly in some fields of public life while it is simultaneously
under vigorous attack in other areas. Judicial decisions and a growing
body of statutes are bringing trial procedures for the first time to the en-

claves of privilege, grant, and largesse that from time immemorial have
been handled by informal procedures and governed by concepts of

official discretion.- The grant of parole,2 eligibility for or termination
of welfare

s

entitlement to public housing or other benefits,4 and the

* Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States; formerly, Professor of
Law, University of Michigan.
This Comment is an elaboration of remarks prepared for delivery at the ALI-ABA
Course of Study on "Atomic Energy Licensing and Regulation" at the Shoreham Hotel,
Washington, D.C., on November 12, 1971. The views expressed herein are solely those
of the author and should not necessarily be attributed to the Administrative Conference
of the United States.
The author acknowledges a strong indebtedness to Barry B. Boyer in the preparation
of this Comment. Needless to say, Mr. Boyer is not responsible for the stubbornness in
which I have persisted in my own views (and errors).
1 See generally O'Neil, Of Justice Delayed and justice Denied: The Welfare Prior
Hearing Cases, 1970 Sup. CT. REv. 161; Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Rights-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. RFv. 1439 (1968); Reich, Individual
Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YAM LJ. 1245 (1965); cf.
Saferstein, Non-resiewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion,"
82 HAxv. L. REv. 367 (1968).
2
See Monks v. State Board of Parole, 58 NJ. 238, 277 A.2d 193 (1971); Comment,
The Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 282 (1971). See also Johnson, Federal Parole
Procedures (Report to the Committee on Informal Actions of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Jan. 1, 1972). A major challenge to the procedures used
in granting or denying parole to federal prisoners is now pending. Childs v. United
States Board of Parole, Civil Action No. 1616-70 (D.D.C. 1972).
s See, e.g., Richardson v. Wright, 40 U.S.L.W. 4232 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
4
See Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham, 386 U.S. 670 (1967);
Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
[ 585 ]
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award of grants5 provide many examples of the rapid expansion of the
lawyers' bag of tricks into areas in which trial techniques had no application until the last few years.
At the same time the heavy reliance on the formal adjudicatory model
on the part of a number of older regulatory agencies has given rise to
criticism. Trial-type procedures, it is argued, are not well adapted to
the broad investigations of social, economic, and scientific fact and
policy that are required in order to set rates in regulated industries, to
determine appropriate levels of competition, to monitor the introduction of new technology, or to protect the public from unsafe products or
harmful commercial practices. 6 The judicialization of regulatory functions, many feel, results in long delays, enormous expense to public and
private participants, and, ultimately, a poor result.7
Perhaps the contradiction inherent in these developments is more
apparent than real. The issue in the former situations involving such
matters as parole, welfare, grants, and benefits is one of some procedure
rather than little or none. When the attack on the existing order must
be made in the courts in terms of constitutional "due process," it is not
surprising that the lawyer's familiarity with and fondness for adversary
hearings, cross-examinations, and the rules of evidence will loom larger
than life. The increasing frequency and importance of the encounters
of individuals with the officials of the welfare state is a central problem
of the rule of law in our time.8 Hopefully it is one in which the accumulation of experience with the dynamic qualities of procedural systems
5 See generally Administrative Conference Recommendation No. 26-Minintum Procedures for Agencies Administering Discretionary Grant Programs, 1970-71 RORT oF
TH ADMImsTRATivE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATEs 58; Tomlinson and Mashaw,
The Enforcement of Federal Standards in Grants-in-Aid Prograns: Suggestions for
Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L. REv. 600 (1972).
6 See, e.g., R. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION: AN EVALUATION OF TME ASH COUNCIL
PRoPosALS (1971); W. Gellhorn, Administrative Procedure Reform: Hardy Perennial,
48 A.B.A.J. 243 (1962); Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory
Commissions,69 YALE L.J. 931 (1960).
7 E.g., R. Noll, supra note 6; Donahue, Lawyers, Economists, and the Regulated Industries: Thoughts on ProfessionalRoles Inspired by Some Recent Economic Literature,
70 MIcH. L. REv. 195 (1971).
8 [Als social justice becomes a conscious end of state policy there is a vast and
inevitable increase in the frequency with which ordinary citizens come into a
relationship of direct encounter with state powerholders. The citizen's significant
encounter now is not with the policeman or the criminal magistrate but with the
official representing a regulatory authority, an administration of social insurances,
or a state-operated economic enterprise. It is this dramatically increased incidence
of encounter that sets the task of the rule of law in the welfare state.
Jones, The Rule of Law in the Welfare State, 58 CoLUM. L. REv. 143, 153 (1958).
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will ultimately lead to procedures, highly acceptable to the individuals
affected, that allow determinations to be made quickly and accurately
and that do not consume inordinate public and private resources in
the handling of millions of individual claims.9 Whether or not a rational
procedural system meeting these requisites will include a heavy reliance
on trial-type proceedings, with lawyers dominating the decision-making
process, is still an open question.
The requirements of mass justice in the welfare state, however, is
another topic for another day; the question of what procedures should
be employed by government in the decision of public controversies,
of course, has proportions of such heroic dimensions that it is best left
to someone more equal to the task. The subject of this Comment is the
inquiry into the appropriate use of the trial-type hearing in administrative decision-making. Even the narrower question of whether trialtype hearings are a useful or desirable means of deciding complicated
issues of scientific, economic, or social fact and policy is a formidable
one, but a start must be made at some point. The use of illustrations
drawn from a single field, that of atomic energy licensing and regulation, may assist in sharpening the focus while narrowing the field even
further.
Before considering what role trial-type hearings can usefully play in
nuclear power plant proceedings, we need to look briefly at the advantages and disadvantages of trial-type proceedings generally and the
values we seek to achieve through any hearing process.
CHARACTEmSTICS OF TAL-TYPE HEARINGS

Trial-type procedure-i.e., adjudication-is one of several general
forms of investigating and deciding problematic situations.10 The other
common means are various forms of management and of decision-byconcord, such as mediation. Adjudication may be defined as a process
in which the affected parties are guaranteed a 'right to participate
through the presentation of proofs and reasoned argument, and in which
a decision is made by rationally applying general principles to particular
DAlfred Conard has borrowed from economics the prefixes "micro" and "macro"
to distinguish between justice which is concerned solely with the just result of an
individual case and justice which takes the aggregative or system approach of looking
at the total consequences of a legal rule or a series of decisions. Conard, Macrojustice:
A Systematic Approach to Conflict Resolution, 5 GA. L. REv. 415 (1971).

'OSee generally Boyer, A Re-evaluation of Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for
Resolving Complex Scientific and Economic Issues 3-23, 32-44 (Staff Report to the

Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Dec. 1, 1971).
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facts." The managerial model differs from adjudication by virtue of
the fact that the decision-maker rather than the parties controls the
course of the proceeding; 2 and mediation, while characterized by party
participation, does not rely on a reasoned application of principle in
reaching a decision.' 3
The essentials of trial-type procedure are well understood. They involve (1) the special characteristics of the tribunal, which should be
impartial and competent; 4 (2) the right of the parties to participate
through special procedural devices, such as entitlement to notice, opportunity to present proof and to cross-examine opposing witnesses, and
the like;' 5 (3) a special requirement that the decision be based on the
record, consistent with accepted principle and rationally explained;'
and (4), as a means of enforcing 7the other requirements, reviewability
of decisions by an appellate court.'

The paradigm for the use of the trial as a decision-making technique
is the criminal or civil case in which the defendant is charged with
violating pre-existing legal standards. Although the characteristics of
such cases are familiar, several are worth brief mention. First, the controversy is two-sided in nature, with the adversaries taking opposing
positions on the issues. Second, the facts generally are within the control or knowledge of the parties and arise out of non-recurring past
events. Third, the issues are bipolar in that they call for a "yes" or "no"
answer. Fourth, the court is impartial and is called upon to decide a
limited number of questions that are usually within the common understanding of the average judge.
'12 Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication 11 (unpublished mimeograph).
1 See, e.g., Hector, supra note 6, at 632-33; cf. Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 846, 847-48 (1961).
Is See Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wisc. L. Rv. 3, 23;
Mentschikoff, The Significance of Arbitration-A Preliminary Inquiry, 17 LAW &
CONTEMPT. PROB. 698 n.1; Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 So. CALIF.
L. REv. 305 (1971).
14See, e.g., Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583, 589-92
(D.C. Cir. 1970); American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966); Gilligan,
Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959).
15E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474
(1959).
16 E.g., Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960); Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597-98 (D.C. Cit. 1971); Holmes v. New
York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968). See also H. FmNDLY,
Tim FEDERALAImaINisrRATm AGExcIES: Tim NEm FOR Brrr D NioN OF STANDA s
(1962).
17 The history and function of judicial review are traced in L. JAm, JUDICIAL CONTRoL OF ADMNIsTRATiVE ACTION 320-94 (1965).
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The shift in focus from the common law court to the administrative
agency invariably involves some stress on the adjudicatory model. The
agency has broader powers and multiple functions, and it is not expected to act as a passive umpire presiding over a private dispute. It has
a program and policies that it is expected to carry out. The proceeding,
instead of focusing on non-recurring past events, will often be concerned with the prediction of future effects or consequences. The
issues may be far more numerous and interrelated than in an automobile
negligence case, for example, and they may not be easily cast in a bipolar form conducive to a "~yes" or "no" answer. The balancing of
competing values-how much is too much considering the vagaries of
an uncertain technology in an uncertain future-is likely to be the crux
of the controversy.' And as the issues broaden, the number of persons
and groups that are affected, or that may be affected depending upon
how subsidiary issues are decided, multiplies rapidly. 9 The participants,
each with a varying pattern of views on the issues and sub-issues, become numerous, and the proceeding loses the two-sided adversary form
characteristic of most courtroom litigation. At the extreme, the trial
may involve issues of such enormous breadth, complexity, and interrelationship that the case loses all form and structure except as a firm
presiding officer or a dominant party, perhaps the agency's staff, gives
it shape.

The trial-type hearing, when compared with other forms of decision18 Decisions of complex questions must always be made in a situation of partial uncertainty. The determination by the Food and Drug Administration whether to certify
a new prescription drug for use must often be made on the basis of a limited showing
of beneficial effect by the drug company and an even more limited showing of possible
negative effects or contraindications. When policymakers must extrapolate to ordinary
use by humans the data developed when massive doses of a drug are administered to
mice, the range of expert opinion, and lack of certainty concerning the validity of any
given opinion, is pronounced. For a general discussion of the problems of public decision-making in conditions of scientific uncertainty, see NATONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
TECHNOLOGY: PROCESSES OF ASSESSMENT AND CHOICE (1969).
19 The decline of the standing doctrine as a barrier to participation in administrative
proceedings or judicial review thereof occurred first in the large regulatory controversies of a "polycentric" character, in part because it was so painfully obvious that
many persons were affected in varying degrees by agency decisions of this character.
The broadening of the standing notion is closely related to the breadth of the proceeding and its possible consequences. See generally Association of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Comment, Judicial Revew of Agency Action:
The Unsettled Law of Standing, 69 MIcH. L. REv. 540 (1971); E. Gellhorn, Public
Participationin Administrative Hearings 10-17 (Report Prepared for the Committee
on Agency Organization and Procedure of the Administrative Conference of the United
States, Oct. 29, 1971).
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making, has both advantages and disadvantages, depending upon the
purposes to which it is put. The advantages may be found in the special
opportunities for party participation, especially those of presenting evidence and cross-examining opposing witnesses. The enforced rationality and conclusiveness of adjudication are also important virtues. On
the other hand, the issues must be severely compressed and put in a
bipolar form. Since trial procedure is intricate and specialized, lawyers
come to dominate the decision-making process even though many issues
may be non-legal. Moreover, trial procedures are enormously expensive
and often dilatory. Finally, since the adjudicator is purporting to decide
only the case before him, he may be less concerned with the long-run
consequences of the decision or of a series of decisions. The focus on
"justice in the individual case" does not lend itself to intelligent forward
planning, to rational consideration of major options and alternatives,
and to a concern for the aggregate effects of individualized decisions.
Nevertheless, the fact is that Congress has provided that much administrative regulation be performed through the medium of trial-type
hearings. 20 This has been due partly to historical accident, partly to
concern for the need to control bureaucratic power, and partly to the
pressure of interests that had much to gain by the use of elaborate trial
procedures. While trials work well, for example, when a license is
being revoked or an alien deported on the basis of past culpable conduct,21 this reliance on litigious methods has been criticized, particu20

In a number of instances, Congress has provided that agency rules of general applicability must be promulgated through formal evidentiary hearings. See generally
Hamilton, The Imposition of Trial-Type Procedures in Administrative Rulemaking
(Report prepared for the Committee on Rulemaking of the Administrative Conference
of the United States, March 9, 1972). In addition, trial-type hearings are used in a
wide variety of economic regulation involving resource allocation, ratemaking and
entry regulation. A few examples are ICC determinations of the reasonableness of the
rates charged by common carriers, 49 U.S.C. § 316(e) (1970); CAB grant of certificates
to engage in air transportation, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1970); and FCC resolution of contested
applications for a broadcast license, 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1970).
21 For example, 15 U.S.C. § 780 (b) (4) (1970) empowers the Securities and Exchange
Commission to "censure, deny registration to, suspend for a period not exceeding twelve
months, or revoke the registration of, any broker or dealer" in certain circumstances
after notice and opportunity for hearing.
The statutory provision governing procedures used in determining deportability of
aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970), provides that the Attorney General must promulgate
regulations including requirements that:
(1) the alien shall be given notice . . .of the nature of the charges against
him and of the time and place at which the proceeding will be held;
(2) the alien shall have the privilege of being represented ... by ... counsel
(3) the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against
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laly in situations in which complex issues of economic, scientific, and
social policy must be considered, the range of alternative solutions is
vast, and a wide variety of interacting interests will be affected-such
as in air route licensing by the CAB 22 or the formulation of food standards by the FDA.23
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING PROCEDURES

An initial problem is to determine by what standards a given procedure should be judged. What are the criteria for evaluating procedural systems?
Procedures, for the most part, are a means to an end-the accomplishment of social purposes. But at the same time procedures in themselves
may create or destroy important values. The usual statement of these
values, in terms of "fairness," "due process," and the like, suffers from
undue generality, since the content of these value-laden words shifts
from time to time and from person to person.
The distinction between rulemaking and adjudication also provides
little help. While the idea that trials are appropriate only for "adjudicative facts" is suggestive, 24 it begs the hard question because the identification of "adjudicative facts" is so subjective and flexible.25 We are
reduced to a basic notion that in a society committed to a representative
form of government, private persons should have a meaningful opportunity to participate in government decisions which directly affect them,
especially when governmental action is based on individual rather than
on general considerations.26
him, to present evidence in his own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government; and
(4) no decision of deportability shall be valid unless it is based upon reasonable,
substantial, and probative evidence.
Intervention and participation by "public interest lawyers" in proceedings of such a
narrow and quasi-criminal character, other than in the form of an amicus brief, is unlikely to be permitted. See Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened
Public Participationin the Administrative Process, 60 GEo. L.J. 525 (1972).
22 See generally Jones, Licensing of Domestic Air Transportationby the Civil Aero-

nautics Board, (Report for the Committee on Licenses and Authorizations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Sept. 1962).
23 See Hamilton, Rulemaking on a Record by the Food and Drug Administration
(Report prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States, Sept. 1971).
24 1 K. DAvis, ADMImIAvE LAW Tar_.nsz 413-14 (1958). See also Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing,70 HARV. L. Rzv. 193 (1956).

25
Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking
and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 521-

22,26536 (1970).

It remains uncertain under Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), whai degree
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Beyond the fundamental principle of meaningful party participation,
any evaluation of administrative procedures must rest on a judgment
which balances the advantages and disadvantages of each procedural
system. In striking this balance, I believe that the following formulation
of competing considerations is more helpful than "fairness" or "due
process": the extent to which the procedure furthers the accurate selection and determination of relevant facts and issues, the efficient disposition of business, and, when viewed in the light of the statutory objectives, its acceptability to the agency, the participants, and the general
public.
The first consideration, accuracy, serves as a short-hand reference to
the rational aspects of a decision-making process. The ascertainment of
truth, or, more realistically, as close an approximation of reality as human frailty permits, is a major goal of most decision-making. There are
better and worse ways, in various contexts, of gathering relevant information, selecting or formulating controlling principles, and applying
the correct principles to the probable facts. Accuracy, moreover, is
not only a facet of each case but an aggregative or system characteristic
of uniform and consistent results that give equal treatment to similarly
situated persons. Accurate results in a particular instance ("justice in
the individual case") may be less important in many areas than a high
degree of consistency in the decision of a large number of cases.
The second consideration, efficiency, emphasizes the time, effort, and
expense of elaborate procedures. The work of the world must go on,
and endless nit-picking, while it may produce a more nearly ideal solution, imposes huge costs and impairs other important values. In the polycentric administrative case, the efficiency of trial procedures meets the
severest test. This criterion, unlike the others, is capable of quantitative
statement since time and effort may usually be stated in dollar terms.
Concern with public costs and expenditures must not be allowed to
of participation by the affected person is required by due process and the extent to
which trial procedures must be provided. As the Court observed in Goldberg, participatory rights must be assessed in terms of the conflicting interests of government
and citizen in each situation: "The extent to which procedural due process must be
afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to
suffer grievous loss,' . . . and depends upon whether the recipients interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication." 397 U.S.
at 262-63. The Court recently had an opportunity to illuminate the Goldberg rationale
as it applied to the Social Security disability program, but instead of examining the
question in detail the majority remanded for further consideration in light of new
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of HEW. Richardson v. Wright, 40 U.SL.W.
4232 (U.S. Feb. 24,1972).
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obscure the fact that the private costs of administrative delay are usually

27
far higher than the total of governmental costs.

The final consideration, acceptability, emphasizes the indispensable
virtues of procedures that are considered fair by those whom they affect,
as well as by the general public.28 Usually this translates into meaningful participation in the decisional process. The authority of decisions
in a society resting on the consent of the governed is based on their
general acceptability. Moreover, if procedures are deemed fair by those
immediately affected, their cooperation and assistance can be obtained,
with the result that administrative action will be better informed and
thought out.
TRIAL-TYPE HEARINGS iN ATOMIC ENERGY LICENSING

Atomic energy licensing and regulation involve the kinds of issues

that place considerable strain upon trial-type hearings. The determination, for example, of whether an atomic reactor is designed with sufficient safety devices or will adversely affect the environment involves
issues that require substantial input from experts of diverse disciplines:
engineers, scientists, economists, and ecologists. The basic issues are economic and political in character, since they involve trade-offs affecting
the allocation of scarce resources. Since increased safety of atomic reactors costs money, and since it is probably impossible to make them

absolutely safe, the decision regarding the protective features that should
be required involves a determination that some level of risk is acceptable
in view of the costs of greater safety. Similarly, preservation of the
scenic beauty or ecology of a power plant site, or alternative siting,
usually will cost more, thus posing a question of finding the point at
27 See P. MAcAvoY, THE EFFECrVENESs op nm FFDmZA POwER Com--mISSION (reprint
issued by the Brookings Institution, 1971).
28 Thereis a tendency on the part of lawyers to think of acceptability in terms of
traditional patterns of legal thinking. Since lawyers have valued and enjoy adversary
proceedings, it is assumed that members of the public also feel the same way. This

assumption, however, is questionable. The issue is one of the acceptability of procedures
to the persons affected and not to any group of professionals in the community. The
views of professionals may be relevant when they will inevitably be involved, but
the reference should not be to lawyers alone. In disability evaluations, for example,
.involving inputs of a medical, occupational, and legal character, the views of doctors
concerning methods that produce accurate determinations in an expeditious, inexpensive
and acceptable manner are as relevant as those of lawyers. Just as war is too important
to be left to the soldiers, justice is so important that it should not be left to the desires
(and profits?) of lawyers. For a useful discussion of the ways in which decision-making
techniques can exclude nonlawyers from the 'decisional prodegs,- See Donahue, supra
note 7.
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which the cost of additional protection for the environment becomes
too great. In deciding these safety and environmental questions, the
AEC must deal with a variety of specialists of relatively narrow expertise, a vast array of alternative choices and potentially affected interests, very rudimentary standards of decision, and a lack of reliable
data from which to extrapolate future conditions.
Within a given project the trade-offs that are necessary may be
placed on a continuum of increasing generality and at some point raise
issues that should be decided by the political process. Thus, in the
reactor-licensing context there may be a narrow, rather technical question of whether a more expensive welding technique should be required
to assure greater safety in the cooling system; a middle-range issue of
whether radiological pollution which would affect an adjacent stream is
acceptable or.should be reduced at greater cost; and a broad policy problem of whether the aggregate restrictions imposed on the plant will cause
power supplies to turn to fossil fuel equipment, with the environmental and economic consequences that would follow from that decision. At some fairly early point in this progression, decisions should
be made not by experts, administrators, or by reviewing judges but by
the elected representatives of the people.
Measured against these needs, how do the procedures stand up? The
current-AEC licensing process is complex and multi-layered. 9 In brief
outline, it begins with a period of bargaining between the AEC staff and
the applicant. After agreement on the important features of the application for a construction permit is reached, the staff prepares a report
which is reviewed by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards,
a fifteen-man panel comprised of technical specialists from outside the
Commission. The ACRS review is conducted at informal, non-public,
non-record conferences, although staff and occasionally representatives
of the applicant attend to iron out differences. The ACRS issues a conclusory report to the Commission, either favoring or opposing the proposed reactor.
A trial-type hearing is then held in the vicinity of the reactor site,
regardless of whether there are any contested safety issues. At issue are
all of the questions previously considered at the informal, non-public
stage. For the first time, however, environmental and citizen groups are
29 For a more complete description of the AEC licensing process, see Ellis & Johnston, Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants by the Atomic Energy Conmission, reprinted
in Hearings on AEC Licensing Procedureand Related Legislation Before the Subcomm.
,on Legislation of the Joint Comm. on -Atomic Efiergy, 92d Cong, Ist Sess., pt. 2, at 581
(1971).
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permitted to participate. The decision-making body at this hearing is
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, which consists of two technically qualified personnel and a chairman "qualified to conduct administrative proceedings." If the Board's initial decision is favorable,
construction may begin-regardless of whether review is sought before
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board and the Commission.
A similar system of informal review takes place when construction has
been completed and the applicant seeks an operating license. In addition, a full-blown hearing may be held at this point if a contest has
developed.
The most important phase of the decision-making process in AEC
licensing is the stage preceding issuance of the construction permit,
which is characterized by exchange of information, negotiation, and
bargaining between the AEC staff, the applicant, and the ACRS. This
is so for a number of reasons. Once construction has commenced, any
change of plans, "backfitting," or delay imposes enormous costs on the
utility applicant and ultimately its customers. Moreover, the dynamics
of the process tend to magnify the importance of the investigation and
bargaining stage that precedes the hearing.
The importance of the informal stage has several significant consequences. On the one hand, the staff has a virtual veto power during
negotiations, since in practice applicants will not persist into later stages
of the proceeding without staff approval. On the other hand, potential
opponents of the plant design or siting, who are excluded at the earlier
stages, tend to view the hearing stage as a stacked deck because the
staff, the applicant, and the ACRS present a united front, with the result
that questions that have previously been debated during negotiations
are minimized during the hearing. With the growing number and increasing sophistication of public intervenors, this situation seems likely
to result, as one critic has said, in "an artificial and distrustful atmosphere
for the licensing process" in which intervenors resort "to the tactic of
delay rather than plotting a strategy for victory." 30
In other words, the licensing process seems to be losing acceptability
among environmental and citizen groups. The result may be that their
dissatisfaction with the process will lead them to resort to procedural
devices that delay the outcome and that force concessions by utility
applicants as the price of abandoning the fight. A procedural system
that allows results to be determined by the leverage which procedure
provides to persistent contestants is a modern-day version of ordeal by
3

oSee id. at 556.
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battle."' The loss of efficiency and acceptability resulting from prol6nged trial-type hearings at two stages has also spread disillusionment
a'mong the utility applicants and efuipment manufacturers. We are approaching a situation in which everyone involved is unhappy.
One obvious proposal would be to abandon public hearings at the
operating-license stage, or at least to impose a high burden of proof on
intervenors before the hearing requirement was triggered. This could
be done on the assumption that most issues relating to the plant design
or site have been litigated at the construction permit stage and that two
bites at the apple should not be allowed. 2
Elimination of the trial-type hearing at the construction permit stage
seems a more hazardous prescription. This might increase the doubts
that environmental groups have about the acceptability of the licensing
process; in addition, there is the further risk that it might impair accuracy as well, with consequences that are too awesome to contemplate.
The AEC's licensing process is already more heavily dominated by
scientists and technicians than most administrative proceedings. While
many of the issues raised during a licensing proceeding are largely technical, it is by no means clear that all of them are; trade-offs involving
value questions of relatively broad social impact must be made, and it
seems doubtful whether it is wise to consign these problems to the exclusive sphere of scientists and specialists. Policy issues should not be
passed off as scientific problems, but should be faced forthrightly as
such.
The maintenance of public confidence in the licensing process argues
in favor of opening it to the greatest possible public scrutiny and input,
a position that, carried to its logical extreme, would call for opening
up the bargaining process. I do not know whether this is feasible or
how it could be accomplished, but it is a possibility that should be
considered.
31 Occasionally vociferous public opposition to a proposed nuclear power plant has
caused utilities to withdraw their applications; see,. e.g., D. NELIUN, NuCLEAR PoWER
AND ITs CvTIcs: TnE CAYuGA LAKE CONTROVFRSY (1971); Green, "Reasonable Assurance"
of "No Undue Risk," ScIENTIST & CrizEN, June/July 1968, at 128, 134.
32 The AEC has recently proposed legislation which would provide for legislative,type hearings at the operating license stage in place of the current trial-type hearings,
and would specify that this hearing, would be available only when "a prima facie
showing has been made by a person whose interest may beaffected by the proceeding
that, as a result of a significant advance or change in the technology occurring after
the most recent licehsing action in the proceeding, addition,; eliminition or modification
of structures, systems or components of the facility will provide substantial, additional
protection" for safety or the environment. H.R. 13731, 92d Cong, 2d Sess. '(1072). ''
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The introduction of third parties into the early informal stage could
complicate the regulatory process rather considerably, with intervening
parties favoring either the staff or the applicant, or taking a wholly
different position. If rights to participate in a relatively unstructured
bargaining process were accorded, would the lack of structure give disproportionate strength to those with the most resources or to those who
were most intransigent? More detailed knowledge about the mechanics
and dynamics of the negotiating process seems necessary before any
predictions can be made.
An alternative to providing plenary third-party participation in the
negotiating process, which has been suggested by some critics, is to
provide for such participation episodically, through a series of public
conferences punctuating the basic two-party negotiations. Whether
such a device would work effectively seems debatable. One key factor
would seem to be timing the conferences so that they would correspond
with important decision points in the bargaining process. If they were
held too early, before the issues were drawn, they would probably
have all the difficulties of unrestricted bargaining, complicated by the
inhibitions inherent in being on the record; if they were held too late,
after a de facto decision had been reached, they could be criticized as
mere window dressing.
A third approach would be to push public participation back into
even earlier stages, into the planning process itself. Proposals for greater
reliance on rulemaking procedure as a method of formulating general
policy would have this effect. The gap between promise and performance when it comes to broader use of rulemaking as a regulatory technique is a large one. If the state of the nuclear art now permits the
approval of standardized designs or matters of similar import in general
rulemaking proceedings, however, this approach may yield dramatic
results in terms of more and better decisions arrived at more quickly.
The AEC is currently conducting two major rulemaking proceedings33 which should provide valuable insight into the possibilities of
resolving complex scientific issues on a generic basis. The first of these
proceedings deals with formulation of acceptance criteria for emergency
core cooling systems, which are safety features designed to keep the
heat in a reactor core from exceeding permissible tolerances in the event
of a failure in the primary cooling system; the other proceeding con33 The procedural rules governing the two proceedings are set forth in 36 Fed. Reg.
22774-75 (Nov. 30, 1971), and were revised by a supplemental notice issued in 37 Fed.
Reg. 287-89 (Jan. 8, 1972).
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cerns the establishment of standards for the discharge of radioactive
effluents from nuclear power plants. In many respects, the procedures
used in these rulemaking proceedings resemble licensing adjudications;
for example, a three-man hearing panel similar to an Atomic Safety
and Licensing Board presides, a verbatim record is kept, cross-examination is permitted, and in general the course of the proceeding is similar
to a licensing hearing. However, discovery is sharply limited in comparison to a licensing proceeding, and the hearing board will not issue
an initial decision or proposed rule. In large measure, the close resemblance of these rulemaking procedures to licensing hearings may result
from the fact that the need for a broad-scale review of the ECCS and
effluents problems first became apparent in contested licensing hearings;
thus, the rulemaking is in many respects like a consolidation of these
individual licensing proceedings. In the future, it may be possible for
the Commission to experiment with less formal rulemaking proceedings
as a means of simplifying these complex safety questions.
Legislative proposals that would require general questions of power
plant authorization and siting (Do we need more power? What fuel
sources should be used and in what proportions? Where, in general,
should the needed plants be located?) to be handled as part of a longrange planning process are receiving much discussion today.34 There
are a number of unanswered questions with respect to such proposals:
At what level of government, and by what agencies and procedures,
are the basic decisions to be made? What devices will be employed to
prevent the reopening of these questions in subsequent licensing proceedings of a more individualized character? Is the proliferation of
agencies and approvals at each level of government-local, state and
federal-merely going to add more layers and steps to a process that is
already labyrinthine and Byzantine? Can we afford the "government
by impasse" that is the likely result of giving each agency and each level
of government a power of veto on any power plant project? Some
fundamental issues of decision-making in a federal republic need to be
resolved before the present confusion will be brought under control.
Pushing issues back into an early planning process also makes it difficult for affected interests to know when and how to participate. The
more generalized the discussion, the less each individual can recognize
3 See, e.g., I.R..605, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 277, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971);
Hearings on Power Plant Siting and Environmental 'ProtectionBefore the Subhbcoim.
on :Communications and Power of the House Conmm. on Interstate and.Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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that his interests are involved or that it is worthwhile advancing them.
Existing statutory provisions governing atomic energy licensing require
a public hearing even in uncontested cases. The statute is premised on
the theory that public notice is particularly important and that a public
hearing is more likely to provide actual notice than the initiation of
planning. Furthermore, Calvert Cliffs85and similar cases86 indicate that
the courts may be disinclined to accept procedures involving advance
planning as a substitute for the AEC's duty to make an independent
assessment of the public interest, through hearings if necessary, absent
a clear and unambiguous statutory limitation on scope of review37
The administrative process huffs and puffs; and small armies of
lawyers and regulators engage in heated and lengthy battles. Yet I
sometimes wonder whether these time-consuming and expensive regulatory controversies should be viewed as rational techniques of decisionmaking or as tribal rites. I believe that confusion has reigned long
enough on the field of atomic energy licensing and other vital areas
affected by agency decisions. Fortunately, there are growing signs of
reconsideration and impending change. We can and must improve the
procedures for reaching decisions in these important areas. The conflict
between full consideration and timely resolution of important issues
must be resolved through the use of procedures that reach accurate
results, are efficient and are acceptable to those affected and the general
public.

35 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
36
E.g., Greene County Planning Board v. FPC, 40 U.SL.W. 2522 (2d Cir. Jan. 17,
1972); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 40 U.SL.W. 2497 (D.C. Cir.
Jan. 13, 1972); Kalur v. Resor, 40 U.S.L.W. 2391 (D. Colo. Dec. 21, 1971).
87For further discussion of some of the problems agencies may face if they are
required to consider all possible alternatives in trial-type hearings and reach an "optimally beneficial decision," see Cramton & Berg, On Leading a Horse to Water: NEPA
and the FederalBureaucracy, 18 PRacrlcA LAWYER- (1972).
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